Why Libya? Why not Iran?

America's descent into strategic dementia -Caroline Glick 

One of the most astounding aspects of the US debate on Libya in recent weeks has been the scant attention paid to the nature of the rebels. The rebels are reportedly represented by the so-called National Transitional Council led by several of Gaddafi's former ministers. But while these men - who are themselves competing for the leadership mantle - are the face of the NTC, it is unclear who stands behind them. Only nine of the NTC's 31 members have been identified.

Unfortunately, available data suggest that the rebels championed as freedom fighters...are not exactly liberal democrats. Indeed, the data indicate that Gaddafi's opponents are more aligned with al-Qaida than with the US.

None of this proves that the US is now assisting an al-Qaida takeover of Libya. But it certainly indicates that the forces being assisted by the US in Libya are probably no more sympathetic to US interests than Gaddafi is. At a minimum, the data indicate the US has no compelling national interest in helping the rebels in overthrow Gaddafi.

And yet, when the mullahs stole the 2009 presidential elections for Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and then violently repressed the pro-Western opposition Green Movement, Obama refused to lift a finger. 

The significance of the US's descent into strategic irrationality bodes ill not just for US allies, but for America itself.
[Jerusalem Post]

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Back to the Shores of Tripoli? -Daniel Pipes, PhD
MARCH 10th , 2011 [prior to the Libya assault]

The official hymn of the U.S. Marine Corps famously begins with "From the Halls of Montezuma to the shores of Tripoli, we fight our country's battles on the land as on the sea." The reference to Tripoli alludes to the Battle of Derna of 1805, the first overseas land combat fought by U.S. troops and a decisive American victory.

Recent fighting in Libya prompts a question: Should the marines be sent anew to the shores of Tripoli, this time to protect not the high seas but the rebellious peoples of Libya rising against their government?

My first instinct is readily to agree to a no-fly zone, thereby improving the odds for the valiant opposition. [S]uch intervention will end the wretched 42-year rule of an outlandish and repulsive figure.

But instinct does not make for sound policy. An act of war requires context, guidelines, and consistency.

However easy the operation might look, Qaddafi could have unexpected reserves of power that could lead to a long and messy engagement. If he survives, he could become all the more virulent. However repulsive he may be, his opponents could be yet more threatening to U.S. interests.
[National Review Online]
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