Syria Can't Be Flipped -Michael Rubin
"Not talking doesn't make us look tough -- it makes us look arrogant," President-elect Barack Obama declares. Throughout his campaign, he has promised renewed engagement. Chief among his diplomatic targets is Syria...
It is tempting to believe that U.S. diplomacy can flip Syria. Alas, as audacious as Obama's hope might be, Syria cannot be flipped. It may be fashionable to blame Bush for the failure to seize a Damascus olive branch, but the real problem has less to do with any U.S. administration and much more to do with Arab history and political culture.
For more than a millennium, Damascus, Baghdad and Cairo have competed for the leadership of the Arab world. [N]ever has there been solidarity among all three. Unity is not an Arab virtue.
Uncomfortable under the same Cold War umbrella as its rivals, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat switched back to the U.S. camp and, some 30 years ago, recognized Israel. Sadat flipped Egypt because he understood leadership meant either dominating or standing apart from his fellow Arabs. Washington eased Egypt's transition with more than $1.5 billion in annual U.S. aid; more than $50 billion in sum so far. Iraq flipped, but by force, at a cost far higher.
Diplomats seeking to flip Assad are asking him to commit political suicide. Aid will not facilitate. For Assad to settle for less than Egypt's aid package would be to confirm his subordination to Hosni Mubarak. A higher package is outside reality: Even the most profligate congressmen cannot stomach another commitment of $50 billion, an amount that could be driven even higher once Tehran begins a bidding war for Syrian loyalty.
So why does Assad flirt with the West? Assad can pocket irreversible incentives: A reprieve from the Rafik Hariri murder investigation, concessions on territorial disputes, an end to sanctions and heightened trade.
When the time comes to reciprocate, Assad can walk away, as his father so often did, leaving Washington with far less leverage than before.
Today, Obama's supporters see policy as the difference between good and Bush. They sing change, but to privilege rhetoric above reality is dangerous hubris.
[Forbes.com]
"Not talking doesn't make us look tough -- it makes us look arrogant," President-elect Barack Obama declares. Throughout his campaign, he has promised renewed engagement. Chief among his diplomatic targets is Syria...
It is tempting to believe that U.S. diplomacy can flip Syria. Alas, as audacious as Obama's hope might be, Syria cannot be flipped. It may be fashionable to blame Bush for the failure to seize a Damascus olive branch, but the real problem has less to do with any U.S. administration and much more to do with Arab history and political culture.
For more than a millennium, Damascus, Baghdad and Cairo have competed for the leadership of the Arab world. [N]ever has there been solidarity among all three. Unity is not an Arab virtue.
Uncomfortable under the same Cold War umbrella as its rivals, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat switched back to the U.S. camp and, some 30 years ago, recognized Israel. Sadat flipped Egypt because he understood leadership meant either dominating or standing apart from his fellow Arabs. Washington eased Egypt's transition with more than $1.5 billion in annual U.S. aid; more than $50 billion in sum so far. Iraq flipped, but by force, at a cost far higher.
Diplomats seeking to flip Assad are asking him to commit political suicide. Aid will not facilitate. For Assad to settle for less than Egypt's aid package would be to confirm his subordination to Hosni Mubarak. A higher package is outside reality: Even the most profligate congressmen cannot stomach another commitment of $50 billion, an amount that could be driven even higher once Tehran begins a bidding war for Syrian loyalty.
So why does Assad flirt with the West? Assad can pocket irreversible incentives: A reprieve from the Rafik Hariri murder investigation, concessions on territorial disputes, an end to sanctions and heightened trade.
When the time comes to reciprocate, Assad can walk away, as his father so often did, leaving Washington with far less leverage than before.
Today, Obama's supporters see policy as the difference between good and Bush. They sing change, but to privilege rhetoric above reality is dangerous hubris.
[Forbes.com]
3 comments:
Foreign policy is not all or nothing. Forbes, while an award winning business publication, whose business reporting I enjoy, is hardly fair and balanced when it comes to anything else. Last time I checked, Obama did not promise to give away the store, or act like a moron. He merely wants to try things differently than what failed to work the last 8 years in some cases, and longer than that in others. Enough of the right-wing pundits explaining why it cannot work. Where were they during the Bush administration? I'll tell you where---singing the praises of right-wing W. Bush, who could do no wrong in their eyes, but who actually, it turned out, did almost nothing right.
I know little of Forbes, never read it. Don't know their foreign policy orientation, but Michael Rubin is a respected academic type. Here's his bio:
Michael Rubin, editor of the Middle East Quarterly, is a senior lecturer at the Naval Postgraduate School and a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.
I thought the analysis was fairly interesting.
The American Enterprise Institute is a conservative think tank, and many of its alumni served in the second Bush administration. Among others, Wolfowitz and Cheney's wife have ties to it. I certainly respect your interest in this piece. I just gave my reasons for why I do not see it the same way.
Post a Comment