Monday, April 22, 2013

Reflections on Boston Marathon Attack


The photo above depicts the bomber coolly passing behind the little boy he murdered at the Boston Marathon.  The bag he left is visible, circled in red. 
Two kids paralyzed an American city with great ease just by being willing to sacrifice their lives if necessary, which is after all the whole theory of the suicide terrorism, we-believe-in-death-you-believe-in-life school of thought.

Whether or not they had some brief training in bomb making and didn’t just take the Internet course isn’t that important. And remember that the Chechen nationalist movements have no interest in attacking the United States. This was al-Qaida, as we can see from the selection of You-Tube videos by one of the bombers.

When I was watching the September 11 attacks on television, an announcer said, “From now on, everything will be different.” And I said out loud to the television set: “No, it won’t.”

For many years before 2001 I carried with me a secret. When reporters would ask me, “Why haven’t terrorists targeted the United States directly?” I didn’t answer.

That’s because the answer was: “Because they haven’t yet realized how easy it would be to do that.”

I didn’t want to be the one who tipped them off. Back then, in the 1980s and 1990s, the Islamist terrorists knew they didn’t know America very well. Also, I suspect, they couldn’t believe how open the United States was, that there weren’t policemen who would follow them around because they were Muslim and Middle Eastern.

Here’s the irony: Only when the terrorist leaders realized that Islamophobia was not a big factor in the United States could they resolve to attack the United States with a belief that they would succeed.
[PJ Media]

Boston Bombing Lesson: Ban Burqas -Daniel Pipes, PhD

The Tsarnaev brothers pulled off their terrorist attack with great skill but made a fatal mistake in letting their faces and bodies be seen at a heavily photographed international sporting event. This meant that multiple images of them were available for a massive law enforcement squad to comb over and, after three days, identify them by name and appearance.

This rapid identification was not unprecedented – the London police had done likewise in the July 2005 suicide bombings but because none of the four perpetrators survived that attack, that was more a theoretical achievement than a practical one. To the best of my knowledge, the Tsarnaevs were the first terrorists to be tracked down via still and video pictures.

Obviously, they should have put on Islamic full body covers that show only the eyes (niqabs) or nothing at all (burqas). These garments have multiple and unique virtues, totally hiding the wearers identity; being legitimate attire in any weather and in any place; permitting the discreet transport of weapons; giving off the helpfully false impression of being worn by women, which both reduces suspicion and misleads witnesses; usefully creating a social barrier; maximizing personal prerogatives; and being ideologically appropriate, sending an unmistakable Islamist signal.

The niqab exposes the eyes, which is a drawback that sunglasses can compensate for; and it has the great virtue of allowing the terrorist to see around him better than the burqa.

One must expect future non-suicide bombers to turn to niqabs or burqas. (As many terrorists and criminals repeatedly have done so: see my 16,000-word blog on this topic.)

But why wait for them to engage in more murders? Why close the barn door only after the horse has run away? Far smarter would be to ban the niqab and burqa in public places now, before tragedy occurs.
[National Review Online]

Pounding Square Pegs into Round Roles - Norvell B. DeAtkine

The demonstrated ineffectiveness of Arab armies in conventional warfare does not apply to the parameters of unconventional warfare, where insurgents displayed initiative and imagination. A number of factors account for this difference.

The guerilla usually had leadership sharpened by battle as well as experience and exuded the confidence that motivated others to follow him - as opposed to a conventional unit commander most likely picked by the regime for political reasons. Moreover, the guerilla was apt to be with those of his own ethnic group, clan, or tribe. The unconventional soldier is fighting within his element with people he trusts.
(GLORIA Center-IDC Herzliya)

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