Lessons of War -Elliot Chodoff
The assault on Hamas in Gaza that began this week has rocked that organization back on its heels and sent a powerful message to others around the Middle East and the world: Israel has learned the tactical lessons of the Second Lebanon War of 2006. It is less clear that the strategic lessons have been learned.
High scores in tactics go to the government, to the intelligence services, [and] the Israeli Air Force's targeting capabilities. This time, the air attacks [on] a regular workday, catching Hamas off guard with its institutions teeming with activity. The results were stark and immediate: hundreds of Hamas terrorists killed and wounded, with a minimum of non-combatant casualties.
IAF precision bombing was enhanced by close coordination with intelligence, providing the air force with high quality targets. [T]he air strike[s] that destroyed 40 tunnels in 4 minutes could only have been the fruit of Hollywood-style spy-craft.
Strategically, the government seems to have made the same mistakes that were made in 2006: failing to link the battlefield operations to a clear path to achieve its stated objectives. A short term weakening Hamas has certainly been achieved, but if the campaign ends with rockets landing in Beersheba and Gedera, the terrorist organization can reasonably claim victory. The fact that the government is even considering a cease fire, stating that if Hamas stops shooting, so will we, clearly indicates that the Israeli leadership has no strategic concept of why it went to war.
Meanwhile, in the north, Hizbullah leader Hassan Nasrallah is now caught on the horns of a dilemma. Witnessing the drubbing his Sunni ally in Gaza is taking from the IDF, he has little inclination to subject his fighters to a similar fate. [However], after years of taunting Israel and prodding Hamas to do the same, he risks scorn and ridicule from his terrorist allies if he decides to stay safely on the sidelines. Stay tuned…
[MidEast: On Target]
High scores in tactics go to the government, to the intelligence services, [and] the Israeli Air Force's targeting capabilities. This time, the air attacks [on] a regular workday, catching Hamas off guard with its institutions teeming with activity. The results were stark and immediate: hundreds of Hamas terrorists killed and wounded, with a minimum of non-combatant casualties.
IAF precision bombing was enhanced by close coordination with intelligence, providing the air force with high quality targets. [T]he air strike[s] that destroyed 40 tunnels in 4 minutes could only have been the fruit of Hollywood-style spy-craft.
Strategically, the government seems to have made the same mistakes that were made in 2006: failing to link the battlefield operations to a clear path to achieve its stated objectives. A short term weakening Hamas has certainly been achieved, but if the campaign ends with rockets landing in Beersheba and Gedera, the terrorist organization can reasonably claim victory. The fact that the government is even considering a cease fire, stating that if Hamas stops shooting, so will we, clearly indicates that the Israeli leadership has no strategic concept of why it went to war.
Meanwhile, in the north, Hizbullah leader Hassan Nasrallah is now caught on the horns of a dilemma. Witnessing the drubbing his Sunni ally in Gaza is taking from the IDF, he has little inclination to subject his fighters to a similar fate. [However], after years of taunting Israel and prodding Hamas to do the same, he risks scorn and ridicule from his terrorist allies if he decides to stay safely on the sidelines. Stay tuned…
[MidEast: On Target]
1 comment:
Generally reasonable, except about the ceasefire. All Israel offered was 48 hours to see what Hamas was willing to do. This is the sort of thing they must offer to appease the world, while giving no real time for Hamas to re-group, re-arm or commit other forms of treachery.
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